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We  revisit  the  “paradox  of openness”  in  the  literature  which  consists  of  two  conﬂicting  views  on  the
link  between  patenting  and open  innovation—the  spillover  prevention  and the  organizational  openness
views.  We  use the  data  from  the  Survey  of  Innovation  and  Patent  Use  and  the  Community  Innovation
Survey  (CIS6)  in  the  UK  to assess  the  empirical  support  for the  distinct  predictions  of these  theories.  We
argue  that  both  patenting  and  external  sourcing  (openness)  are  jointly-determined  decisions  made  by
ﬁrms. Their  relationship  is contingent  upon  whether  the  ﬁrms  are  technically  superior  to their  rivals  andatent use
atent
xternal knowledge source
ommunity innovation survey
lead  in  the market  or not.  Leading  ﬁrms  are  more  vulnerable  to unintended  knowledge  spillovers  during
collaboration  as  compared  to followers,  and  consequently,  the  increase  in patenting  due to  openness  is
higher for  leaders  than  for followers.  We  develop  a  simple  framework  that  allows  us  to  formally  derive  the
empirical  implications  of  this  hypothesis  and  test  it by  estimating  whether  the  reduced  form  relationship
between  patenting  and  collaboration  is  stronger  for leaders  than  for  followers.
ublis©  2016  The  Authors.  P
. Introduction
Over the last quarter century two apparently contrasting trends
ave marked the innovation process. On the one hand, patents have
ecome increasingly important as an appropriation tool (OECD,
004; WIPO, 2007). On the other, innovators are increasingly
elying upon collaboration with other ﬁrms and organizations
Chesbrough, 2003). The question we address in this paper is
he relationship between sourcing knowledge from the outside to
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develop innovations and using patents to appropriate the returns
from innovation.1
The relationship between the reliance on external sources and
the appropriability strategy of ﬁrms has been analysed extensively
since the early paper by Cassiman and Veugelers (2002). This liter-
ature has converged around two conﬂicting points of view, which
Laursen and Salter (2014) dub the “paradox of openness”, namely
that opening up to outside sources of knowledge to innovate may
weaken the ﬁrm’s power to capture rents from that knowledge. In
other words, openness, or external sourcing, entails a trade-off. On
the one hand, ﬁrms are more likely to seek external collaborators
if they can protect their innovation by patents, and more generally,
guard against unintended knowledge spillovers to partners. We
call this the “spillover prevention” view. The second view, which we
call “organizational openness”, holds that a focus on patenting and
exclusivity makes a ﬁrm less efﬁcient in developing collaborative
innovations, and hence also, a less attractive partner.
Our paper advances the debate on openness versus patenting
in several ways. First, we argue in this paper that the relationship
1 There is an older and even more extensive literature on the importance of
patents for selling or licensing technology (Arrow, 1962; Arora et al., 2001; Gans
et al., 2008). See also Arora and Gambardella (2010) for a survey of the literature.
nder the CC BY license. (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/)
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etween external sourcing (openness) and patenting is contingent.
irms will make different choices depending upon whether they
re technically superior to their rivals and lead in the market or
ot. Put differently, the trade-off between appropriating beneﬁts
nd enhancing the efﬁciency of collaboration differs between lead-
rs and followers. Leading ﬁrms are more vulnerable to unintended
nowledge spillovers during collaboration as compared to follow-
rs, and consequently, the increase in patenting due to openness
s higher for leaders than for followers. We  test this by estimat-
ng whether the reduced form relationship between patenting and
ollaboration is stronger for leaders than for followers.
Second, we advance the literature by treating both patent-
ng and openness as choices made by the ﬁrm, and therefore, as
ointly determined endogenous variables. The existing literature
as treated either openness as logically prior to appropriability
e.g., Laursen and Salter, 2014) or appropriability as logically prior
e.g., Zobel et al., 2013). We  develop a simple framework that pro-
ides a useful way to link the underlying theories based on the costs
nd beneﬁts of collaborative innovation to the observed relation-
hip between patenting and openness. Instead of interpreting our
esults as causal relationships, we treat them as describing the pat-
erns of association between patenting and openness, and use our
ramework to infer what these patterns imply for various theories,
nd how this varies between leaders and followers.
Our third contribution is to introduce new and more precise
easures of the use of patents based upon a new survey, instead
f relying upon perceived importance of various appropriability
trategies as much of the existing literature has done. Our data are
ased on a survey of over 800 UK ﬁrms using the sixth wave of the
ommunity Innovation Survey (CIS 6). We  are able to augment our
ata by also using the responses of these ﬁrms in the CIS 6.
The remainder of this paper is organised in the following way:
ection 2 surveys the relevant literature on the paradox of open-
ess and highlights the issues that limit the empirical analysis in
his area. Section 3 articulates why leaders face a different trade-
ff from followers, and provides a simple model of the beneﬁts and
osts of openness that links the theoretical trade-off to behaviour,
hich motivates our empirical analysis. Section 4 introduces the
ata and describes our key measures. Section 5 discusses the empir-
cal results. Section 6 concludes.
. Openness and appropriability
.1. Theoretical views
There are two dominant views on how patenting is related to
se of external knowledge sources in innovation – we call these
he “spillover prevention”  theory and the “organizational openness”
heory.
In the “spillover prevention”  theory (Cassiman and Veugelers,
002) ﬁrms engaged in outside collaboration favour the use of
atents as a means of reducing spillovers of valuable knowledge
o external partners. In the simplest version of the spillover the-
ry, ﬁrms want to prevent imitation of their (focal) innovation and
atent in order to protect the rents from that innovation. The likeli-
ood of spillovers is greater if the ﬁrm is open i.e., if it collaborates
ith a partner, because collaboration inevitably reveals more infor-
ation to others than if the innovation were entirely in-house.
It is widely recognized that using external knowledge could
ake it more difﬁcult to protect the innovation. For instance,
oordhoff et al. (2011) argue that innovations sourced from cus-
omers carry the risk that the customer may  implement the
nvention itself, in effect becoming a competitor. Giarratana and
ariani (2014) argue that using outside sources of knowledge
akes it harder to enforce secrecy within the ﬁrm, increasing the 45 (2016) 1352–1361 1353
risk of imitation. Consequently, if a ﬁrm is unwilling to patent, or
if patents are ineffective, it may  choose to be closed. The key take-
away is that a ﬁrm has a greater incentive to patent if it is open than
if it is closed. Simply put, in this view, we expect to see a positive
association between patenting and openness.
Protecting the focal innovation is not the only source of positive
association between patenting and openness. Many innovations are
complex and require prior knowledge or background knowledge.
Crucial bits of background information can leak out to partners
during collaboration. Patents can protect against leakage of back-
ground material as well. Arora and Merges (2004) develop an
analytical model in which the fear of knowledge spillovers may  lead
ﬁrms to internalize research even if internal research is less produc-
tive than external research, and the patents condition this trade-off.
Using ﬁrm-level data from Germany, Buss and Peukert (2015) doc-
ument a positive link between R&D outsourcing and intellectual
property infringement, particularly for generic knowledge.
More broadly, scholars have argued that strong IPRs are often
beneﬁcial and potentially even necessary for open innovation
(Arora and Gambardella, 1994; Chesbrough, 2003). Thus, Graham
and Mowery (2006) suggest that “. . . IP protection creates a plat-
form for the transfer of knowledge assets.  . .”  (p.185). Note that
Arora and Gambardella (1994) and Graham and Mowery (2006)
have focused on the importance of IP protection to the agent trans-
ferring knowledge rather than sourcing it, whereas this paper is
focused on ﬁrms sourcing external knowledge.
A different source of positive association between patenting and
openness is that open ﬁrms may  patent to signal their innova-
tive capabilities to other ﬁrms (Alexy et al., 2009; Hagedoorn and
Ridder, 2012). For instance, Hagedoorn and Ridder (2012) surveyed
86 ﬁrms which are active in open innovation and found that nearly
90% of the ﬁrms regard patent as important method for signaling
the nature of their technological capabilities.
In sum, ﬁrms that rely on external sources of knowledge (open
ﬁrms) will patent much more than ﬁrms that do not (closed ﬁrms)
for three reasons. First, they want to protect their focal innovation
produced through collaboration; second, they want to protect the
background knowledge implicit in the innovation; and third, they
want to send out precise signals about their value as innovation
partners.
By contrast, the “organizational openness” theory, inspired partly
by studies of open-source software and the literature on “collective
invention” (cf. Allen, 1983; Bessen and Nuvolari, 2012), implies that
ﬁrms engaged in external collaboration should be less likely to use
patents. Laursen and Salter (2014) note that a focus on patenting
may  make it harder to collaborate with outsiders. For instance, Foss
et al. (2011) show that in order to beneﬁt from customer interac-
tions, ﬁrms have to delegate responsibility and increase internal
communication. An unintended consequence may  be that propri-
etary information can spill out. In other words, a focus on protecting
the ﬁrm’s proprietary information is likely to make it more difﬁcult
to collaborate with outsiders. Other scholars have also stressed the
tension between IPR and openness to outside knowledge. Jensen
and Webster (2009) contend that knowledge capture practices
may  impede collaborative knowledge creation process. For exam-
ple, interacting with other organizations to stimulate knowledge
creation relies on interdependencies and reciprocities, whereas
patenting gives rise to exclusivity. The emphasis on exclusivity that
a patenting intensive appropriation strategy entails can impede the
efﬁciency of collaborative development of innovation.
Interestingly, even those who  believe that open innovation is
often facilitated by strong intellectual property rights (IPR), con-
cede that ﬁrms may  beneﬁt from voluntarily waiving some of their
intellectual property rights (Chesbrough and Appleyard, 2007;
Pisano, 2006). The strategy that ﬁrms choose to purposefully dis-
close selected knowledge to general public (including competitors),
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Huang et al., 2014; Alexy et al., 2013; Zobel et al., 2013).5 This
is problematic because both patenting and openness are strate-
gic choices by the ﬁrm and it is difﬁcult to assign logical priority.354 A. Arora et al. / Research
nstead of keeping them proprietary, is termed as “selective reveal-
ng” (Henkel, 2006; Henkel et al., 2014; Alexy et al., 2013).2 By
ngaging in selective revealing, a focal ﬁrm can encourage others
o participate in shared problems solving or to make complemen-
ary investments (Alexy et al., 2013). In other words, patenting
nd associated secrecy can make a ﬁrm a less attractive partner
o potential collaborators. Thus, the organizational openness view
ould posit that ﬁrms that seek external knowledge for innovation
re less likely to patent because patenting impedes their ability to
ain from collaboration, and because they want to be attractive
artners for potential collaborators.
To summarize, the literature on openness and appropriability
as stressed different aspects of the tradeoff. The empirical litera-
ure has also documented a variety of ﬁndings. Some studies ﬁnd
 positive relationship between appropriability and openness. For
nstance, Cassiman and Veugelers (2002) use data on Belgian inno-
ators from the European Community Innovation Survey (CIS) to
est how ﬁrms fashion their appropriation strategy to guard against
pillover of knowledge in formal R&D collaborations. They ﬁnd that
he reported effectiveness of “strategic appropriation” (secrecy,
omplexity, lead-time) is positively related to the probability of
xternal collaboration, but also that the probability of external
ollaboration is not related to the effectiveness of intellectual-
roperty protection (patents, trademarks, and copyrights). Zobel
t al. (2013) ﬁnd that patenting is positively associated with differ-
nt types of external collaborations for a sample of solar technology
tart-ups in the U.S.
Other scholars report opposite ﬁndings. Based on the survey
ata of 785 Australian ﬁrms, Jensen and Webster (2009) conclude
hat the ﬁrms favoring internal R&D and relying upon secrecy and
atenting are less likely exchange of knowledge with partners.
hen ﬁrms do use external knowledge, they rely on licensing, hir-
ng other organizations’ workers, and public domain sources such
s patent disclosures, publications and technical meetings. Firms
hat rely upon external knowledge operate in the opposite manner:
hey are less likely to use patenting and secrecy and collaborate
ith suppliers, customers, and other partners. Alexy et al. (2014)
o not report the direct relationship between patenting and open-
ess, but their results indicate that patenting intensive ﬁrms are
ess likely to be open, particularly when they are underperforming.
Other studies report intermediate ﬁndings. For instance,
rundel (2001) analyses the data of the 1993 European Commu-
ity Innovation Survey for up to 2849 R&D-performing ﬁrms, and
nds only weak evidence that participation in cooperative R&D
ncreases the value of patents over secrecy for product innova-
ions. Laursen and Salter (2014), using data on over 2900 innovators
rom the 4th UK community Innovation Survey, ﬁnd that openness
rst increases and then decreases with an emphasis on appro-
riability. Huang et al. (2014) use data from a 2003 survey of
ver 4000 Australian ﬁrms. They too ﬁnd that the degree of open-
ess is non-linearly related to appropriability. However, when they
estrict attention to formal appropriability (patents, copyrights and
rademarks), they ﬁnd a positive relationship between appropri-
bility and openness. Arora et al. (2014), using data on nearly 1500
merican manufacturing ﬁrms, ﬁnds that there is no systematic
ifference on average between ﬁrms that used external inventions
ersus those that used internal inventions. However, they also ﬁnd
2 Practices similar to selective revealing have long existed and can be found in
istorical accounts. Allen (1983) documents how the sharing of information among
ompetitors in the English blast furnaces industry in 1850–1875 contributed to
he  innovation and development of the industry. Nuvolari (2004) also studies the
ollective invention settings in the Cornish mining district in the early period of
ndustrialization, which contributed to the development of one of the key technolo-
ies  of that period, steam power.y 45 (2016) 1352–1361
that ﬁrms that relied upon customers and suppliers for inventions
were less likely to patent the focal invention than ﬁrms that relied
upon internal invention, whereas ﬁrms that used inventions from
universities, independent inventors and R&D suppliers were more
likely to patent the focal invention.
2.2. Econometric and measurement challenges
The empirical literature on openness and appropriability suf-
fers from some shortcomings. Many studies have tended to use
measures of appropriability in general, often because speciﬁc infor-
mation on patent use is difﬁcult to obtain.3 Yet, the use of patents is
fundamentally different from other types of appropriability strate-
gies such as secrecy, ﬁrst mover advantage or product complexity.
For instance, collaboration will surely weaken the ability of the
ﬁrm to keep secrets. Indeed, Arundel (2001) reports that open-
ness is associated with a greater importance of patenting relative
to secrecy. Similarly, knowledge itself is “non-rival” in use. Conse-
quently, both partners can use it, reducing the chances of conﬂict,
unless one partner wishes to patent it. Thus, Huang et al. (2014)
ﬁnd different results when they focus on formal versus informal
appropriability. By focusing on a widely studied means of appropri-
ability, namely patenting, we hope to sharpen our understanding
of this complex topic.
Another shortcoming is the use of the reported effectiveness
of patents as perceived by the respondent rather than actual use
of appropriation methods to protect innovations. Perceived effec-
tiveness scores are problematic. Though ordinal, they are typically
treated as cardinal variables in regressions. Perhaps even more
problematic is that they are not easy to compare across respon-
dents. Many, but not all, of the studies cited above, including
Arundel (2001), Cassiman and Veugelers (2002), Laursen and Salter
(2014), and Huang et al. (2014), use ordinal scaled measures of the
importance of appropriability mechanisms, which are then aggre-
gated in a variety of ways.
Actual measures of patenting intensity of innovations can over-
come this limitation but are not commonly used.4 Pérez-Lun˜o and
Valle-Cabrera (2011), Cohen et al. (2000), Alexy et al. (2014) ask
innovating ﬁrms about their use of patenting in general (speciﬁ-
cally, the percentage of their innovations for which they had applied
for patents), but Arora et al. (2014) ask respondents whether they
had patented their most signiﬁcant innovation—the innovation that
accounted for a plurality of their sales—over the last three years.
In our empirical analysis, we feature the latter measure, namely
whether the ﬁrm has patented its most signiﬁcant innovation. We
ﬁnd similar, though weaker, results using the share of innovations
protected by patents.
Lastly, the empirical literature has treated the trade-off between
appropriability (patenting) and openness as a causal relationship
(e.g., Cassiman and Veugelers, 2002; Laursen and Salter, 2014;3 For instance, Laursen and Salter (2014) do not distinguish between formal
appropriation mechanisms such as patents, and appropriation via secrecy or lead-
time, Cassiman and Veugelers (2002) divide appropriation strategy into formal
appropriation strategies (which include patents, but also trademarks and copy-
rights) and other types of appropriation strategies.
4 Earlier rounds of CIS typically lacked information on actual use. In some
instances, all that was asked was whether the ﬁrm had patented or not, without
normalizing by the scale of innovation activity. The latest UK CIS does ask for actual
share of innovations protected by the different methods of appropriability.
5 In some cases, scholars (e.g., Huang et al., 2014) have compounded the problem
by not distinguishing between ﬁrms that successfully innovate and those that do
not.  It is likely that ﬁrms that do not innovate are less likely to patent and also less
likely to report external collaborations.
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Pr(patent| no collaboration) = exp(V′)/(1 + exp(V′)) (6′)
6 For instance, the payoff with no collaboration and no patenting is V + 1, where
  is distributed with GEV type I distribution, and the other payoffs are analogously
deﬁned. These are the assumptions underlying the familiar multinomial logit model.A. Arora et al. / Research
mpirically, this requires instruments for the endogenous choice, a
ifﬁcult task which the literature has rarely undertaken success-
ully. This problem can however be sidestepped because theory
oes not prescribe causality. Instead it prescribes patterns of asso-
iation. An example of such an approach is Buss and Peukert (2015),
ho eschew causal estimation and instead use reduced form esti-
ation to show that R&D outsourcing is associated with higher
ikelihood of product infringement.
Further, as developed more fully in the next section, the associ-
tion between openness and patent use will differ in strength, and
erhaps also in direction, across different types of ﬁrms. Firms have
eterogeneous abilities but there is little attempt in the empirical
iterature to distinguish between the different types of ﬁrms—such
s ﬁrms which are technology leaders and those that are tech-
ology followers. In other contexts where technological leakages
ay  pose a strategic threat or advantage, scholars have empha-
ised the different costs of collaboration to leaders and followers.
or example, writing about agglomeration economies, regional
pillovers and MNE  location, Alcácer and Chung (2014) and Chung
nd Alcacer (2002) ﬁnd technology leaders care more about access-
ng scientiﬁc resources from locations while technology followers
re likely to position themselves to proﬁt from locating in areas
here spillovers are prevalent. Agglomerations thus mainly attract
echnology followers that hope to beneﬁt from spillovers while
echnology leaders are more likely to pursue specialised scientiﬁc
ssets.
. Leaders, followers and the paradox of openness revisited
The tradeoff between openness and appropriation is contin-
ent upon the type of ﬁrm. Speciﬁcally, the association between
atenting and openness will be stronger when the focal ﬁrm invests
eavily in research and development, and relies upon product inno-
ation, because such a ﬁrm is more vulnerable to spillovers during
ollaboration. Such ﬁrms will have proprietary technical informa-
ion which distinguishes them from rivals. Their proﬁts are also
ore sensitive to the entry of imitators, which erode innovation
ents. These ﬁrms, whom we call leaders, are more likely to bene-
t from patents if they are open, as compared to followers, who
ave less to gain from patenting, and potentially more to gain
rom successfully collaborating. Followers have less proprietary
echnical information. They also typically have less to fear that
heir spillovers will facilitate the entry of other competitors. As a
esult, their beneﬁts from patenting should be less closely related
o whether they are open or not, as compared to leaders.
To express this intuition more precisely, we develop a frame-
ork which makes explicit the costs and beneﬁts of both openness
nd patenting and recognises that ﬁrms make decisions on patent-
ng and openness at the same time. Let V be the value from the
nnovation without collaboration and (V + x + y) be the value with
ollaboration. We  assume x > 0 which is the same as assuming
hat collaboration creates value. When there is a potential for
pillovers, the value with collaboration will include an additional
erm, y, which y represents leakage of knowledge. We  assume that
pillovers reduce value i.e., y < 0. Thus x + y represents the net incre-
ental proﬁt from collaborating during innovation.
Patenting offers ﬁrms an opportunity to reduce leakage losses
uring collaboration and, independent of collaboration, potentially
lso increases the value of the innovation by preventing imitation.
or a closed ﬁrm, let Vp be the payoff from innovation with a patent,
nd V′ = Vp − V represent the change in value if ﬁrm patents. Simi-
arly, for an open ﬁrm, the payoff it patents is Vp + xp + yp, where xpepresents the beneﬁt of collaboration with a patent, and yp rep-
esents the loss of value due to leakage of information protected
y a patent. Thus x′ = xp − x represents how the incremental value
rom collaboration changes if the ﬁrm patents. Similarly y′ = yp − y 45 (2016) 1352–1361 1355
represents the reduction in value loss due to leakage of valu-
able information, either about the focal innovation or background
knowledge.
Note that V′ represents the “traditional” motive for patenting,
namely to protect the focal innovation. Not all innovations can be
patented. Moreover, an innovation may  not be worth patenting,
once the direct costs of obtaining a patent and the indirect costs, in
the form of disclosure, are taken into account. Therefore, V′ can be
either positive or negative.
One can interpret x′ as representing the potential inefﬁciency in
collaboration when the partners are trying to collaborate but one
is focused on patenting. Organisational-openness theory implies
x′ < 0 because patenting reduces the value from collaboration.
Finally, y′ represents the potential beneﬁt from patenting to
guard against spillovers during collaboration, and the spillover-
prevention theory implies y′ > 0. The sum, x′ + y′, represents the
difference in the incremental payoff to patenting between open
and closed ﬁrms.
Since patenting and openness are not randomly assigned to
ﬁrms but jointly determined, moving from theoretical trade-offs to
observed combinations of choices depends not only on the payoff to
that choice but also the payoffs of all other choices. Using the nota-
tion developed above, we can specify four combinations, along with
the associated payoffs – (i) collaborate and patent (Vp + xp + yp);
(ii) collaborate and not patent (V + x + y); (iii) not collaborate and
patent (Vp); and not collaborate and not patent (V). If we assume
that the payoff from each choice has an additive error term that is
iid and distributed with a Generalized Extreme Value (GEV) distri-
bution, the probability of the different combination of choices can
be written as follows6
Pr(nocollaborate&nopatent) = exp(V)/D (1)
Pr(nocollaborate&patent) = exp(Vp)/D (2)
Pr(collaborate&nopatent) = exp(V + x + y)/D (3)
Pr(collaborate&patent) = exp(Vp + xp + yp)/D (4)
Where D = exp(V) + exp(Vp) + exp(V + x + y) + exp(Vp + xp + yp)
Notice that the joint probability given in (4) is related to but dif-
ferent from the probability of collaboration given patenting—the
focus of much of the empirical literature. In fact there are four
conditional probabilities we could derive and they are given by:
Pr(collaboration|patent) = exp(Vp + xp + yp − Vp)/
(1 + exp(Vp + xp + yp − V)) = exp(xp + yp)/(1 + exp(xp + yp))
(5)
Pr(no collaboration | patent) = 1/(1 + exp(xp + yp)) (5′)
Pr(patent|collaboration) = exp(Vp + xp + yp − V − x − y)/
(1 + exp(Vp + xp + yp − V − x − y)) = exp(V′ + x′ + y′)/
(1 + exp(V′ + x′ + y′)) (6)Though we  do show the joint probabilities using simple contingency tables, sepa-
rately for leaders and followers, we do not estimate a multinomial logit because it
would imply estimating a separate set of parameters for each of the choices. With
limited number of observations, we chose to directly estimate the expectation of
patenting conditional upon openness for leaders and followers.
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ogy leaders or technology followers.10 The clustering was based
on two  variables, viz. R&D intensity (measured the logarithm of
internal R&D expenditure divided by number of employees) and
the value of innovations (measured by the percentage of revenue
9 Of these 329 ﬁrms, 81 ﬁrms had not reported an innovation in CIS 6 but 18 of
those 81 had reported ongoing innovation and so were asked questions about col-
laboration. Only 1 ﬁrm of the 18 that had answered the question on collaboration
had reported collaborating with a large number of partners. Furthermore, 47 of the
remaining 63 ﬁrms (75%) had neither bought external R&D nor acquired a patent
license (another measure of openness). Hence we treated all the 63 ﬁrms as being
closed. Excluding these 63 ﬁrms from the sample altogether yields qualitatively sim-356 A. Arora et al. / Research
Some of the literature (e.g. Laursen and Salter, 2014) has effec-
ively compared (5) with (5′).7 Zobel et al. (2013) by contrast ﬁnd
hat the conditional mean of patenting is higher for open than
losed ﬁrms. They thus compare (6) and (6′).
Our framework allows us to infer something about the underly-
ng beneﬁts and costs of patenting and collaboration by observing
he patenting and collaboration choices made by the ﬁrm. For
nstance, if one ﬁnds that patenting ﬁrms collaborate more than
on-patenting ﬁrms, this lets us infer that the sum xp + yp >0. How-
ver, one might ﬁnd that xp + yp >0 and xp + yp< x + y can be both
rue, so that patenting actually reduces the beneﬁt of collabora-
ion compared to non-patenting. Again drawing on our framework
bove, we can see that E(Patenting| open) − E(Patenting| closed)
s positive if and only if x′ + y′ is positive. Therefore, a positive
ssociation between patenting and openness lets us infer that
pillover-prevention dominates organizational-openness.
Thus far, however, we have treated all ﬁrms as homogeneous.
f ﬁrms differ, as we argue they do, the average relationship may
onceal signiﬁcant differences, which are both of practical and the-
retical signiﬁcance. To see this we develop the framework further
nd use the subscripts L and F to denote leaders and followers
espectively. As noted right at the beginning of this section we
xpect spillover prevention will dominate organizational openness
or leaders because leaders have more to fear from imitation and
nowledge spillovers. This is equivalent to x′L + y′L > 0. In this sit-
ation we expect to ﬁnd leaders patenting more than followers.
hus, If we  observe E(Patent | open)L > E(Patent |closed)L then we can
nfer that spillover prevention dominates organizational openness for
eaders, or, x′L + y′L > 0 (Proposition 1a).8
Similarly, if x′F + y′F < 0, then we could expect that organizational
penness dominates spillover prevention for followers. Followers
ave less proprietary technical information. As followers, they also
ypically have less to fear that their spillovers will facilitate the
ntry of other competitors. Thus, ﬁrms that are open and seek
o beneﬁt from collaboration would also patent less. Thus, if we
bserve that E(Patent | open)F < E(Patent |closed)F , we can infer that
rganizational openness dominates spillover prevention for followers,
.e., x′F + y′F < 0 (Proposition 1b).
Comparing patenting by closed leaders and followers reveals
he relative value of patenting for leaders and followers If E(Patent
 closed)L > E(Patent |closed)F we can infer that leaders value patents
ore than followers even absent collaboration, i.e.,  V′L > V′F (Proposi-
ion 2a).
Comparing patenting by open leaders and followers will reveal
f open leaders gain more from patenting than open followers. That
s,
If E(Patent | open)L > E(Patent |open)F then we infer that leaders
alue patents more when collaborating compared to followers, i.e.,
V′L + x’L + y’L)− (V′F ′ + x’F + y’F ) >0 (Proposition 2b).
In our empirical analysis, we also test the more com-
act hypothesis E(Patent | open)L − E(Patent |closed)L > E(Patent |
pen)F − E(Patent |closed)F . This hypothesis, we believe, is the
losest to intuitive argument that leaders are more susceptible
o spillovers during collaboration than are followers. E(Patent |
pen)L − E(Patent |closed)L represents the increase in patenting by
eaders when they are open compared to when they are closed.
(Patent | open)F − E(Patent |closed)F represents the corresponding
hange for followers. Put differently, the difference in patenting
etween open and closed ﬁrms will be larger among the group
f ﬁrms classiﬁed as leaders when compared to the difference in
7 We treat collaboration (or openness) as well as patent as binary. For binary
ariables, the conditional mean is the same as the conditional probability, so that,
or  instance, Pr(Collaboration |patent) = E(collaborate | patent).
8 Proofs of this and other statements are provided in the appendix.y 45 (2016) 1352–1361
patenting between open and closed ﬁrms among followers. In sta-
tistical language we  look for “differences in differences”.
4. Data, methods and variables
4.1. Data
We  use the Survey of Innovation and Patent Use (SIPU) commis-
sioned by the UK Intellectual Property Ofﬁce in September 2012 and
administered by the telephone survey team of the Ofﬁce of National
Statistics to test our conjectures. The survey is based on a sampling
frame drawn from the sixth wave of Community Innovation Survey
(CIS 6) conducted in 2006–2008 and asked questions about ﬁrms’
innovation and technology in-licensing activities over 2009–2012.
The advantage of this sampling frame is that it gave us information
on the antecedent technological behaviour of the surveyed ﬁrms.
The sample eligible for SIPU comprised of ﬁrms that agreed to
be contacted again when they took part in the 2009 UK CIS (the CIS
6). In all 1365 ﬁrms were contacted and the survey achieved 801
completed interviews and 10 partial interviews, yielding a response
rate of 60.1%. 464 ﬁrms could not be contacted and 74 refused to
participate in the survey. The SIPU sample yielded information on
329 innovating ﬁrms.
4.2. Identifying open and closed ﬁrms
We  classify the 329 innovative ﬁrms into open and closed inno-
vative ﬁrms. The openness is deﬁned according to the number of
different types of the ﬁrms’ external collaborators.9 In the CIS 6,
ﬁrms are asked whether they cooperated in innovative activities
with six types of organizations: suppliers of equipment, mate-
rials, services or software; clients or customers; competitors or
other businesses in their industry; consultants, commercial labs,
or private R&D institutes; universities or other higher education
institutions; and government or public institutes. If a ﬁrm collab-
orated with two  or more types of external partners on innovation
(the median number of collaborators is two), it is classiﬁed as an
open innovative ﬁrm. Otherwise, it is considered as a closed inno-
vative ﬁrm. This method resulted in approximately equal numbers
of open and closed ﬁrms- there were 163 open and 166 closed ﬁrms.
4.3. Identifying technology leaders and followers
We  use a k-means cluster analysis to classify ﬁrms as technol-ilar results. We also get similar results if we  reclassify ﬁrms as open or closed based
on  whether they had engaged in external technology acquisition, i.e. they either pur-
chased technology licenses or externally contracted R&D in our survey, or acquired
external R&D and acquired external knowledge in CIS6. The threshold of a ﬁrm being
classiﬁed as open is lower and we  found 193 open ﬁrms and correspondingly fewer
closed ﬁrms.
10 The cluster procedure begins with two initial group centers. Observations are
assigned to the group with the closest center. The mean of the observations assigned
to each of the groups is computed, and the process is repeated. These steps continue
until all observations remain in the same group from the previous iteration (Stata,
2015).
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Table  1
Summary Statistics of Leader and Follower Firms.
R&D intensity % of revenue from
product innovation
Leader Minimum 0 18
Mean 1.03 32.39
Maximum 4.17 75
Follower Minimum 0 0
Mean 0.38 3.03
Maximum 4.41 8
Total Minimum 0 0
Mean 0.64 14.62
Maximum 4.41 75
Table 2
Number of Firms in Four Categories by Leadership and Openness.
Leader Follower Total
Open 70 93 163
f
e
b
i
ﬁ
o
l
4
a
d
s
t
m
w
1
i
p
s
W
S
a
t
1
a
r
F
i
f
s
v
w
h
n
i
i
pClosed 61 105 166
Total 131 198 329
rom product innovation). Unlike openness, where we have roughly
qual numbers of open and closed ﬁrms, the cluster analysis sensi-
ly yields more followers than leaders. We report the average R&D
ntensity and average turnover from innovations for ﬁrms classi-
ed as leaders and followers in Table 1. Based on the leadership and
penness measures, we  group the ﬁrms into four categories: open
eader, closed leader, open follower and closed follower (Table 2).
.4. Patenting
We  follow Arora et al. (2014) by measuring whether the ﬁrm had
pplied for a patent for their most signiﬁcant innovation. Respon-
ents were asked, “Of all the new or signiﬁcantly improved goods or
ervices or processes you brought to market since November 2009,
hink of the one that accounts for the most turnover”- thus, the
ost signiﬁcant innovation is their most valuable one. Then they
ere asked if they applied for a patent for this innovation. Around
/6th of the innovative ﬁrms had patented their most signiﬁcant
nnovation (see the mean of “whether the company applied for a
atent for signiﬁcant innovation”, Table 3).11
We  veriﬁed the robustness of our results using a second mea-
ure of patent propensity viz. the share of innovations patented.
e follow Arundel and Kabla (1998) and Cohen et al. (2000) in the
IPU survey to ask ﬁrms what percentage of their innovations was
ssociated with patent applications. In response, ﬁrms were asked
o select one of six bands for the innovations viz. less than 10%,
0–40%, 41–60%, 61–90%, over 90%. We  assume that the percent-
ge in each band is concentrated around the midpoint. Among all
espondents, the mean share of innovations patented is around 5%.
or patenting ﬁrms only, the mean share of innovations patented
s about 26%. Both measures yield very similar results. We  only
eature the results for whether the ﬁrm had patented its most
igniﬁcant innovation because typically ﬁrms have only a few inno-
ations. The featured measure minimizes measurement error.12 As
ell, we can control for whether the innovation is a product inno-
11 Most of the extant literature uses a dummy  variable indicating whether the ﬁrm
as patented or not as an indicator of patent use. This measure of patent use does
ot allow us to control for the scale of innovations—larger ﬁrms will have more
nnovations and so will more often patent more. Moreover, ﬁrms with multiple
nnovations are more likely to ﬁle at least one patent than a ﬁrm, with the same
atent propensity, which has few innovations because of a smaller scale.
12 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for highlighting this point. 45 (2016) 1352–1361 1357
vation or not. Doing so is important because process innovations
are typically less likely to be patented.
4.5. Control variables
To control for the inﬂuence of the codiﬁability of ﬁrms’ knowl-
edge on the patentability of their innovations, we  follow Brusoni
et al. (2005) and create a variable codiﬁcation of knowledge based
on the perceived importance of information from scientiﬁc journals
and trade/technical publications and importance of information
from technical, industry or service standards to ﬁrms’ innovation
related activities, which are recorded in the CIS 6. The CIS6 asks
ﬁrms to rank from 0 to 3 the importance of information received
from various sources to a ﬁrm’s innovation activities, where 0 indi-
cates that the source is not used and 3 indicates that it is very
important. The value of codiﬁcation of knowledge is the highest value
that a ﬁrm gave to these two  sources.
We use the logarithmic employment as a measurement of a ﬁrm’s
size. In the regression with the dependent variable of whether the
company applied for a patent for signiﬁcant innovation, we add
a control variable turnover from signiﬁcant innovation to control
for the importance of the signiﬁcant innovation to the ﬁrm. In the
SIPU, ﬁrms were asked to indicate what percentage of total turnover
was from the signiﬁcant innovation, such as 1–5%, 6–10%, 11–25%,
26–50% and more than 50%. We  take the midpoint in each band as
the value for the control variable. We  also add a dummy variable
signiﬁcant innovation is a new good to control for the higher prob-
ability that a new good would be patented in comparison to the
probability that a new service or process would be patented.
To control for industry characteristics, we  generated 17 dummy
variables at the two-digit industry level. A dummy variable is
assigned to a two-digit industry as long as there are greater than
8 observations from this industry. Our results are unchanged if
we use other industry controls, such as classifying industries into
high, medium, and low technology intensity groups. The summary
statistics and correlation matrix of the variables are presented in
Table 3.
5. Empirical analysis
We begin by showing the joint distribution between openness
and patenting, speciﬁcally the four probabilities given by expres-
sions (1)–(4). The data indicate a modest positive relationship
between openness and patenting. This positive relationship is much
stronger for leaders, but reversed for followers. We  follow up on this
analysis with a more traditional regression analysis where we  esti-
mate the expected value of patenting conditional upon whether the
ﬁrm is a leader or not, and whether it is open or not, controlling for
various ﬁrm characteristics. We  prefer this approach to the more
obvious multinomial logit because it links our paper more closely to
the existing literature, and makes it easy to see how the increase in
patenting between open and closed ﬁrms varies between leaders
and followers. A multinomial logit also requires estimating three
times as many parameters, greatly reducing the statistical power
of tests of differences.13
5.1. Descriptive analysisWe begin with a simple descriptive analysis where we divide
ﬁrms into whether they patent their most signiﬁcant innovation
(henceforth, patent)  and whether they are open. Table 4a shows
the result for the sample as a whole. The numbers in each cell
13 The multinomial logit estimates yield qualitatively similar results.
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Table 3
Summary statistics and correlation matrix.
Variables Number of
Observations
Mean Standard
Deviation
Min Max
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1 Innovator applied for a
patent for signiﬁcant
innovation
328 15.85 36.58 0.00 100.00 1.00
2  Open leader 329 0.21 0.41 0.00 1.00 0.15 1.00
3  Closed leader 329 0.19 0.39 0.00 1.00 −0.05 −0.25 1.00
4  Open follower 329 0.28 0.45 0.00 1.00 −0.05 −0.33 −0.31 1.00
5  Closed follower 329 0.32 0.47 0.00 1.00 −0.05 −0.35 −0.32 −0.42 1.00
6  Log employment 329 4.01 1.40 1.39 9.83 0.12 −0.04 −0.01 0.10 −0.06 1.00
7  Codiﬁed knowledge 329 1.31 1.07 0.00 3.00 0.10 0.22 −0.11 0.25 −0.35 0.09 1.00
8  Turnover from signiﬁcant innovation 316 0.14 0.20 0.00 0.75 −0.01 0.29 0.07 −0.17 −0.15 −0.07 0.04 1.00
9  Signiﬁcant innovation is a new good 329 0.60 0.49 0.00 1.00 0.22 0.26 0.00 −0.09 −0.14 −0.03 0.06 −0.07 1.00
Table 4a
Openness and patenting of focal innovation: all ﬁrms.
Patent Not Patent Total
Open 30 133 163
9.15% 40.55% 49.7%
Closed 22 143 165
6.71% 43.6% 50.3%
Total 52 276 328
15.85% 84.15% 100%
Table 4b
Openness and patenting of focal innovation: leaders.
Patent Not Patent Total
Open 18 52 70
13.85% 40% 53.85%
Closed 7 53 60
5.38% 40.77% 46.15%
Total 25 105 130
19.23% 80.77% 100%
Table 4c
Openness and patenting of focal innovation: followers.
Patent Not Patent Total
Open 12 81 93
6.06% 40.91% 46.97%
Closed 15 90 105
7.58% 45.45% 53.03%
a
t
n
b
i
3
p
4
o
o
t
i
T
o
ﬁ
Table 4d
Percentage of ﬁrms patenting focal innovation.
Leader Follower Leader minus follower
Open 25.71 12.90 12.81**
(5.26) (3.50) (6.09)
Closed 11.67 14.29 −2.62
(4.18) (3.43) (5.53)
Open minus Closed 14.05** −1.38
(6.88) (4.91)
closed follower) as a measure of conditional mean of patenting, theTotal 27 171 198
13.64% 86.36% 100%
re the counts of the ﬁrms in each category, and their share in the
otal sample. These correspond to the joint probabilities of open-
ess and patenting. Note that there is a modest positive association
etween openness and patenting. For instance, overall about 16% of
nnovators patent, whereas over 22.5% of open innovators patent.
To relate this to the model developed in Section
, we note that [Pr(open & patent) − Pr(open & no
atent)] − [Pr(closed & patent) − Pr(closed & no patent)] = [9.15%-
0.55%] − [6.71% − 43.60%] = 5.49% consistent with the notion that
verall patenting and openness are positively associated.
Tables 4b and 4c show the same results separately for technol-
gy leaders and followers respectively. In Table 4b we  see clearly
hat the positive association between patenting and collaboration
s much stronger than average in the case of technology leaders.
able 4c shows virtually no relationship between patenting and
penness for followers. In other words, these simple descriptive
ndings suggest that for leaders, spillover prevention dominatesNote: The numbers in parentheses are standard errors. *** denotes a signiﬁcance
level of 1%, ** denotes a signiﬁcance level of 5%, * denotes a signiﬁcance level of 10%.
organizational openness, whereas the two forces appear to largely
balance each other for followers.
Table 4d summarizes this point by showing the conditional
probabilities, which much of the literature has implicitly focused
on. The difference in patenting between open and closed ﬁrms
varies between leaders and followers. We  see that E(patent |open
leader) is nearly 26% while E(patent |closed leader) is less than 12%;
Open leaders are twice as likely to patent as close leaders. Instead,
E(patent | open follower) is 13% whereas E(patent | closed follower)
is 14%; open followers are slightly less likely to patent than close
followers, although the difference is not statistically signiﬁcant.
These patterns are consistent with our theoretical argument
that leaders are more vulnerable to spillovers. Thus, when lead-
ers collaborate in innovation they are more likely to use patents
than when they innovate internally, and this difference is large
and statistically signiﬁcant. However, when followers collaborate
in innovation, they are not more likely to patent than when they
innovate internally.
5.2. Regression analysis
The simple differences in conditional means do not control for
a variety of other factors, such as scale and industry characteris-
tics. Accordingly, we  estimate the expectation of whether the ﬁrm
patents its most signiﬁcant innovation conditional on the ﬁrm type
(e.g., open leader, closed leader, open follower, closed follower), as
well as a variety of ﬁrm characteristics and industry dummies. The
most straightforward way of doing so is through a linear regression
speciﬁcation; the estimated regression coefﬁcients are the condi-
tional means we theorize about. Probits or logits yield very similar
results.
Since we are using the coefﬁcients of the regression equation
on the four groups (open leader, closed leader, open follower andstatistical signiﬁcance of the coefﬁcient is less important for our
analysis than the difference in coefﬁcient values across the groups.
Thus, we  report in Table 5b the results on a number of F-tests which
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Table  5a
OLS regression. Dependent variable = 1 if Innovator applied for a patent for signiﬁcant innovation.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Open leader 25.71 22.01 13.54 12.64 2.66
(5.26) (8.10) (9.94) (10.70) (11.29)
Closed leader 11.67 10.75 2.19 2.05 −5.73
(4.17) (6.98) (9.52) (9.99) (9.97)
Open  follower 12.90 10.08 1.41 −0.80 −7.26
(3.50) (7.04) (8.88) (9.75) (10.15)
Closed follower 14.29 14.78 6.69 6.14 −0.26
(6.59) (9.01) (9.69) (9.69)
Log  employment 2.20 2.29 2.54
(1.67) (1.73) (1.70)
Codiﬁcation of knowledge 2.00 2.10
(2.27) (2.23)
Turnover from signiﬁcant innovation −3.85 −0.28
(10.92) (10.82)
Signiﬁcant innovation is a new good 10.33
(4.14)
17  industry dummies No Yes Yes Yes Yes
N  328 328 328 316 316
R2 0.18 0.26 0.26 0.27 0.28
F-statistic 15.66*** 3.28*** 3.19*** 2.90*** 2.85***
Table 5b
Size and F-Statistics for difference in estimated coefﬁcients.
F Statistics for difference in estimated coefﬁcients in the OLS model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
H0: coefﬁcient of open leader = coefﬁcient of closed leader Difference 14.05 11.26 11.35 10.59 8.39
F-value 4.38** 2.89* 2.95* 2.27 1.37
H0:  coefﬁcient of open leader = coefﬁcient of open follower Difference 12.81 11.93 12.13 13.44 9.92
F-value 4.12** 3.55* 3.74** 4.12** 2.16
H0:  coefﬁcient of closed leader = coefﬁcient of closed follower Difference −2.62 −4.03 −4.5 −4.09 −5.47
F-value 0.23 0.55 0.67 0.54 1.02
H0:  coefﬁcient of open follower = coefﬁcient of closed follower Difference −1.39 −4.7 −5.28 −6.94 −7.0
F-value 0.08 0.91 1.20 1.66 1.75
H0:  coefﬁcient of open leader − coefﬁcient of closed leader = coefﬁcient
of  open follower − coefﬁcient of closed follower
Difference 15.43 16.63 16.63 17.53 15.39
F-value 3.45* 3.95** 4.34** 4.52** 3.47*
N  perfo
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**  denotes a signiﬁcance level of 1%, ** denotes a signiﬁcance level of 5%, * denotes
ests the equivalence of the conditional mean for patenting. Each
olumn of Table 5b corresponds to a column of reported coefﬁcients
n Table 5a. We  also examine whether the difference in patenting
etween open and closed leaders is greater than the corresponding
ifference in patenting among followers. Formally, we test that the
difference in difference” is positive and signiﬁcant and the two-
ailed test of this hypothesis is reported in the last row of Table 5b.
Tables 5a and 5b show that the patterns shown in Tables 4a–4c
old even after controlling for ﬁrm and technology characteris-
ics, and industry ﬁxed effects. In the ﬁrst column of Table 5a,
e regress the four choices of ﬁrms against the use of patents to
rotect their most signiﬁcant innovation and do not include any
ndustry dummies or ﬁrm controls. Column 1 in Table 5b thus
eproduces the speciﬁcation implied by Table 4d. We  see that
(patent |open)L − E(patent |closed)L = 25.71 − 11.67 = 14.05, which
s both large and statistically signiﬁcant, as shown in the ﬁrst row
f Table 5b. Following our discussion in Section 3, we  infer that
’L + y’L > 0 (Proposition 1a).
Similarly, we ﬁnd that E(patent |open)L − E(patent
open)F = 12.8, also large and statistically signiﬁcant. Inclusion
f additional controls does not change this result very much (seermed on the regression coefﬁcients reported in corresponding columns of Table 5a.
iﬁcance level of 10.
second row of Table 5b). Following the discussion in Section 3
(Proposition 2b), we infer that (V′L + x′L + y’L)−V′F + x’F + y’F) > 0.
However, we also ﬁnd that E(patent |closed)L − E(patent |closed)F
is −2.62, but statistically insigniﬁcant. As formally demonstrated
in Proposition 2a, this implies that VL’ = VF’. As well, E(patent
|open) F − E(patent |closed)F is slightly negative, but statistically
insigniﬁcant, at −1.38. According to Proposition 1b, this implies
x’F + y’F = 0.
Consistent with these ﬁndings, the change in patenting for
followers that collaborate compared to followers that do not
collaborate is signiﬁcantly smaller than for leaders.i.e., {E(patent
| open)L − E(patent |closed)L} − {E(patent |open)F − E(patent
|closed)F} = 15%, which is both large (recall that mean patenting
rate is only slightly larger than 15%) and statistically signiﬁcant, as
can be seen in the last row of Table 5b.
Column 2 shows that including 17 industry ﬁxed effects has
only a slight effect on the differences in the conditional means.
The difference in patenting rates between open and closed lead-
ers decreases from about 14% to about 11% once industry effects
are included. However, the difference in patenting rates between
open and closed followers becomes more negative (increases in
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bsolute value), from −1.4% to about −4.7%. As a result, the “differ-
nce in difference” also increases slightly from 15.4% to 16.0%. This
ifference in difference is statistically signiﬁcant and quantitatively
arge, equal to the mean rate of patenting in the sample as a whole.
Columns 3 and 4 progressively add controls for ﬁrm size, codi-
cation of knowledge and percentage of turnover from signiﬁcant
nnovation. Although the differences in conditional means remain
ore stable, the precision of the estimates falls as standard errors
ncrease. For instance, in Column 3, the differences in patenting
ates between open and closed leaders is about 11.4%, whereas the
ifference between open and closed followers is nearly −5.3%. The
ifference in difference actually increases to 16.6% (compared to
6.0% with only industry effects). Column 5 additionally controls for
hether the signiﬁcant innovation is a good (henceforth, a product
nnovation), rather than a service or process. Product innovations
re more likely to be patented (Cohen et al., 2000). Compared
o processes, products are harder to protect through secrecy but
nfringement of product patents is easier to detect and litigate. Fur-
her, recall from Table 3 that leaders are more likely to introduce
roduct innovations. Indeed, we ﬁnd that product innovations are
ore likely to be patented, and controlling for the nature of the
nnovation, signiﬁcantly reduces the size of the estimated coefﬁ-
ients for both open and closed leaders. However, the difference
n patenting rates between open and closed leaders decreases only
lightly to 8.4%. The difference between open and closed follow-
rs is −7.0%, so that the difference-in-difference is 15.4%, which
s similar in magnitude to the other speciﬁcations and statistically
igniﬁcant as well.
In sum, we ﬁnd that open leaders patent more than closed
eaders, and that open leaders patent more than open followers.
owever, closed leaders patent at similar rates as closed follow-
rs and open followers. It follows that the association between
penness and patenting is positive and signiﬁcant for leaders, and
s signiﬁcantly larger than the association between openness and
atenting for followers. From this, using our framework we infer
hat for UK CIS6 ﬁrms x’L + y’L is positive and x’F + y’F = 0. These
elationships imply that leaders are vulnerable to spillovers while
ollaborating and this concern outweighs any potential beneﬁts
rom attracting collaborators and enhancing the efﬁciency of col-
aboration. By contrast, for followers any concerns about spillovers
f background knowledge appear to be balanced by beneﬁts from
penness in terms of enhancing the efﬁciency of collaboration.
nterestingly, we also ﬁnd that V′L = V′F which suggests that both
eaders and followers have similar valuations for the traditional
eneﬁts of patents.
. Conclusion
This paper has revisited the “paradox of openness”, which
escribes a trade-off when ﬁrms open up to outsiders to generate
nowledge may  weaken the ﬁrm’s power to capture knowledge.
ssociated with this paradox, there are two opposing theoretical
ypotheses. On the one hand, ﬁrms are more likely to seek exter-
al collaborators if they can protect their innovation by patents,
nd more generally, can guard against unintended knowledge
pillovers to partners. We  call it the “spillover prevention”  theory. In
his view, we expect to see a positive correlation between patent-
ng and openness. On the other hand, patenting and exclusivity
akes a ﬁrm less efﬁcient in developing collaborative innovations,
nd hence also, a less attractive partner. We  dub this the “organiza-
ional openness” theory. It implies a negative relationship between
atenting and openness.
In this paper we start from the premise that both patenting and
penness are jointly determined, and therefore, one cannot use a
ausal inference approach, common in this literature. We  thereforey 45 (2016) 1352–1361
develop a simple empirical framework that incorporates the joint
determination of both variables. We  argue that the relationship
between patenting and openness is contingent on the technologi-
cal and innovation leadership of ﬁrms. Firms will make different
choices about being open and about patenting depending upon
whether they are technically superior to their rivals. We  use our
framework to derive the empirical implications of this contingency
for the relationship between patenting and openness. We  test this
empirically, using a novel survey of a sample of over 325 innovative
ﬁrms that were also covered in the sixth wave of the UK  Community
Innovation Survey.
We conclude that the trade-off between openness and patent-
ing is resolved differently by different types of ﬁrms. Leading ﬁrms
are more vulnerable to unintended knowledge spillovers during
collaboration as compared to followers, and consequently, we ﬁnd
that the increase in patenting due to openness is higher for leaders
than for followers. Followers, with incremental innovations that
beneﬁt less from patenting and with little proprietary technology
and knowhow, may  be less willing to patent because it makes them
a less attractive open partner and perhaps also less able to derive
value from collaboration.
Our model was  simple as it enabled us to work with the ﬁrm
level data we  have. However, it is plausible that ﬁrms may  lead
in some areas but follow in others. Indeed collaboration works
because ﬁrms have strengths in complementary technologies and
pooling resources can help both ﬁrms to gain from the others’
expertise. Is the relationship between openness and patenting best
analysed at the project level rather than the ﬁrm level? And if so,
how do the choices in one project affect those in future projects?
Answering these questions requires reﬁning the simple theoretical
model developed here. It also requires as well as more disaggre-
gated innovation project-level data, which we  currently lack. We
hope however that our paper stimulates additional research on this
and other dimensions of the tradeoff between appropriability and
openness.14
Appendix A.
The following relationships are useful, and have been derived in
the text.
Pr(Patent|open)L = exp(V′L + x′L + y′L)/(1 + exp(V′L + x′L + y′L))
Pr(Patent|closed)L = exp(V′L)/(1 + exp(V′ L))
Pr(Patent|open)F = exp(V′ F + x′F + y′F)/(1 + exp(V′F + x′F + y′F))
Pr(Patent|closed)F = exp(V′ F)/(1 + exp(V′ F))
Proposition 1a. E(Patent |open)L > E(Patent |closed)L iff x′L + y’L > 0
Proposition 1b. E(Patent | open)F < E(Patent |closed)F iff x’F + y’F < 0
Proof of Proposition 1
E(Patent|open)L − E(Patent|closed) = Pr(Patent|open)L
− Pr(Patent|closed)L
′ ′ ′ ′{1 + exp(V′ F + x′F + y′F)(1 + exp(V′ L)}
14 We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for raising this point.
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= {exp(V′ L)(exp(x′L + y′L)−1)}/
{(1 + exp(V′F + x′F + y′F)(1 + exp(V′L)}
 0 iff exp(x′L + y′L) > 1 iff x′L + y′L > 0
The proof of 1b follows similarly.
roposition 2a. E(Patent |closed)L > E(Patent |closed)F iff V′L > V′F,
nd
roposition 2b. E(Patent | open)L > E(Patent |open)F iff
′
L + x’L + y’L > V′F + x′F + y′F
roof of proposition 2
E(Patent|closed)L − E(Patent|closed)F = Pr(Patent|closed)L
− Pr(Patent|closed)F
= exp(V′L)/(1 + exp(V′ L)) − exp(V′F)/(1 + exp(V′ F))
= {exp(V′ L) − exp(V′F)}/{(1 + exp(V′L)(1 + exp(V′ F)}
 0 iff V ′ L > V ′F
E(Patent|open)L − E(Patent|open)F = Pr(Patent|open)L
− Pr(Patent|open)F
= exp(V′L + x′L + y′L)/(1 + exp( V′L + x′L + y′L))
− exp(V′F + x′F + y′F)/(1 + exp(V′F + x′F + y′F))
= {exp(V′L + x′L + y′L) − exp(V′F + x′F + y′F)}/
{(1 + exp(V′L + x′L + y′L))(1 + exp(V′F + x′F + y′F))}
 0 iff V ′L + x′L + y′L > V ′F+ x′F + y′F
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